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Article
On the Right to External SelfDetermination: “Selfistans,” Secession, and
the Great Powers’ Rule+
Milena Sterio*
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of self-determination is not novel in modern
international law. It stems back to the beginning of the 20th
century, when world leaders in the wake of World War I
realized that national peoples, groups with a shared ethnicity,
language, culture, and religion, should be allowed to decide their
fate—thus, to self-determine their affiliation and status on the
world scene.1 The same idea applied later in the same century
to colonial peoples, and by the 1960s, it became widely accepted
that oppressed colonized groups ought to have similar rights to

+
I respectfully borrow the term “selfistan” from novelist Salman Rushdie, who wrote
(sarcastically) in Shalimar the Clown, “Why not just stand still and draw a circle
round your feet and name that Selfistan?” SALMAN RUSHDIE, SHALIMAR THE CLOWN
102 (2005). I believe that Rushdie may have been incredibly prophetic in some
respects: some groups (“peoples”) seem to be able to form their “selfistans” with the
support of the most powerful nations (the “Great Powers”) on our planet. This
article attempts to decipher who such peoples are, and why their struggles are
viewed as legitimate and deserving of independence and statehood, while others
have been denied the same quests.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. J.D., Cornell Law
School, magna cum laude, 2002; Maitrise en Droit (French law degree), Université
Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2002; D.E.A. (master’s degree), Private
International Law, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, cum laude, 2003; B.A.,
Rutgers University, French Literature and Political Science, summa cum laude,
1998. The author would like to thank Ekaterina Zabalueva for her invaluable
assistance with the research and writing of this article.
1. See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia:
“Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”? Revolutionary International Legal Theory or
Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 UCLA J. INT’L. L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 387–
88 (2005) (describing the evolving philosophy of self-determination in the wake of
World War I, as articulated by leaders like Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin).
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auto-regulate and to choose their political and possibly
sovereign status.2 However, as decades passed by and as
separatist minority groups throughout the world began
challenging the concept of state territorial integrity, it became
clear that the notion of self-determination had to be somehow
confined.3 Thus, courts and scholars came up with two different
forms of self-determination: internal and external.4 The former
potentially applies to all peoples, and signifies that all peoples
should have a set of respected rights within their central state.5
Minority groups should have cultural, social, political, linguistic,
and religious rights and those rights should be respected by the
mother state. As long as those rights are respected by the
mother state, the “people” is not oppressed and does not need to
challenge the territorial integrity of its mother state.6 The
latter form of self-determination applies to oppressed peoples,
whose basic rights are not being respected by the mother state
and who are often subject to heinous human rights abuses.7
Such oppressed peoples, in theory, have a right to external selfdetermination, which includes a right to remedial secession and
2. See Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to SelfDetermination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 503,
557 (2008) (describing the “wave of decolonization” in the second part of the 20th
century, which involved several self-determination options for the decolonized
people).
3. Scholars have already noted that the self-determination rhetoric has been
of limited utility to most non-colonial oppressed peoples and that it has not helped
such groups in their territorial claims and quests. Id. at 556–59 (noting that the
concept of self-determination has had “limited utility in determining the fate of the
territory historically inhabited by people of a nation or ethnie,” because the right to
self-determination “offers little remedy to the dispossession of land.”). This implies
that the right to self-determination seems at odds with the territorial integrity of
any state or region.
4. See, e.g., In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.)
(distinguishing between rights to internal versus external self-determination for the
Quebecois within Canada); The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the
Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of
Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106 (1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Report] (deciding that
the Aalanders, a small island group belonging to Finland and seeking to reunite
with Sweden, had the right to cultural and ethnic autonomy, but not the right to
separate from Finland); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial
Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 379 (2003) (noting the different
forms of self-determination available to a people, which include autonomy, selfgovernment, free association, and ultimately, secession).
5. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
6. Id.; see also Aaland Islands Report, supra note 4.
7. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.); see also Aaland
Islands Report, supra note 4 (concluding that the Aalanders would have the right to
separate from Finland only if Finland disrespected their cultural rights).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION

139

independence.8
In theory, the distinction between internal versus external
self-determination is easy to draw, and a scholar or a judge
should have no difficulty deciding which minority groups should
accrue the more drastic right to external self-determination.
Simply look to the human rights record of the mother state, and
if the record shows violations, then the minority group should be
allowed to separate. In reality, the distinction is very difficult to
draw. Numerous minority groups around the globe have been
mistreated and have asserted their rights to external selfdetermination, only to find themselves rebuffed by the world
community.9 On the other hand, some minority groups have
found strong support in the eyes of external actors and have
garnered sufficient international recognition to be allowed to
separate.10 Why? What is so unique about some minority
groups and about their quests for independence that would
justify the authorization to remedially secede? When exactly—
under what circumstances—does the right to external selfdetermination accrue?
In order to answer these complex questions, this Article will
discuss, in Part II, the notion of self-determination, its history,
and its recent applications. In Part III, this Article will describe
how the theory of self-determination is linked to other
international law concepts, such as statehood, recognition,
sovereignty, and intervention. In Part IV, this Article will focus
on several case studies to illustrate the discrepancy of results
attached to the self-determination struggles by different
peoples. This Article will describe the self-determination quests
of East Timor,11 Kosovo, Chechnya, South Ossetia, and
8. Scharf, supra note 4, at 381 (noting that modern-day international law has
embraced the right of non-colonial people to secede from their mother state “when
the group is collectively denied civil and political rights and subject to egregious
abuses.”).
9. Castellino, supra note 2, at 557–59 (noting the limited value of selfdetermination rhetoric to some minority groups).
10. Successful examples of self-determination where minority groups were able
to exercise their right to remedial secession include Kosovo, East Timor, Eritrea,
Bangladesh, and the Baltic Republics. See Milena Sterio, The Kosovar Declaration
of Independence: “Botching the Balkans” or Respecting International Law?, 37 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 275 (2009); see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER &
DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 112 (2d ed. 2006).
11. As discussed in Part IV.A, East Timor gained independence in 2002. At
that time, the state’s preferred English name became the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste. However, because this Article refers to time periods both pre and post
independence, I use the term East Timor for ease of reference. See CENTRAL
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Abkhazia, and will show that while the first two entities
achieved external self-determination, the latter three did not.
Finally, in Part V, this Article will argue that each selfdetermination seeking entity needs to meet four different
criteria in order to have its quest validated by the international
community. These four criteria include a showing by the
relevant people that it has been oppressed, that its central
government is relatively weak, that it has been administered by
some international organization or group, and that it has
garnered the support of the most powerful states on our planet.
This Article will conclude by positing that the fourth criterion is
the most crucial one: that any self-determination seeking group
must obtain the support of the most powerful states, which I
(and other scholars) refer to as the “Great Powers.” It is the
Great Powers’ support, or lack thereof, that determines the fate
of numerous peoples on our planet struggling to gain
independence. This Article will posit that the right to external
self-determination accrues for different peoples if and when the
Great Powers decide to recognize those peoples’ causes.
Ultimately, this Article will argue that such a result is
unfortunate, as it inappropriately mixes the legal with the
political realms, and that any rule by the Great Powers
inherently challenges the notion of state sovereignty and
equality.
II. NOTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of self-determination has a long history and
has been used and discussed throughout the 20th century. It
has evolved to a norm of customary international law, and its
contours represent a wide-ranging spectrum of alternatives for
the minority group seeking to self-determine its fate.12 Thus,
self-determination rights for a minority group may involve
simply political and representative rights within a central state,
on the one hand, or may amount to remedial secession and
ultimately independence on the other.13

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2009 (2009), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. Id.
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A. HISTORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Self-determination in international law is the legal right for
a “people”14 to attain a certain degree of autonomy from its
sovereign.15 As early as 1918–19, leaders like Vladimir Lenin
and Woodrow Wilson advanced the philosophy of selfdetermination: the former based on violent secession to liberate
people from bourgeois governments, and the latter based on the
free will of people through democratic processes.16 Today, the
principle of self-determination is embodied in multiple
international treaties and conventions,17 and has “crystallized
into a rule of customary international law, applicable to and
binding on all states.”18
14. Although the term “people” is ambiguous and vague under international
law, it typically refers to “people who live within the same state . . . or people
organized into a state.” Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution
of the Status of Kosova: Uti Possedetis, The Ethnic Principle, and SelfDetermination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 353, 367 (2005). Thus, “people” is a legal
rather than natural category. Id. Moreover, the term “people” has been purposely
left undefined in international law, because if the right to self-determination were to
be applied broadly to all conceivable groups, this could destabilize states and cause
peace and security problems. Bartram S. Brown, Human Rights, Sovereignty, and
the Final Status of Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 235, 249 (2005).
15. The principle of self-determination was first elevated to the international
plane by President Woodrow Wilson, who included it in his infamous Fourteen
Points. President Woodrow Wilson, Address Before the League of Nations to
Enforce Peace (May 27, 1916), in CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916); see also Scharf,
supra note 4, at 378. For a full discussion of the principle of self-determination, see
Gruda, supra note 14, at 369–82.
16. Kelly, supra note 1, at 387–88.
17. The term “self-determination” stems from Article 1 of the United Nations
Charter, which speaks of the “principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. Subsequent declarations voted by the U.N.
General Assembly also refer to the term “self-determination.” See, e.g., Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514
(XV), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/64 (Dec. 24, 1960) (“All peoples have the right to selfdetermination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”); Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
(XXV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/64 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“The establishment of a sovereign and
independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people
constitutes modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.”).
18. Scharf, supra note 4, at 378; see also Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16,
31–32 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31–33 (Oct. 16); Frontier Dispute
(Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 566–67 (Dec. 22); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.),
1995 I.C.J. 90, 265–68 (June 30).
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Under the principle of self-determination, a group with a
common identity and link to a defined territory is entitled to
decide its political future in a democratic fashion.19 For a group
to be entitled to exercise its collective right to selfdetermination, it must qualify as a “people.”20 Traditionally, a
two-part test has been applied to determine when a group
qualifies as a people.21 The first prong of the test is objective
and seeks to determine to what extent the group members
“share a common racial background, ethnicity, language,
religion, history, and cultural heritage,” as well as the
“territorial integrity of the area the group is claiming.”22 The
second prong of the test is subjective and examines “the extent
to which individuals within the group self-consciously perceive
themselves collectively as a distinct ‘people,’” and “the degree to
which the group can form a viable political entity.”23
Once the determination has been made that a specific group
qualifies as a people and thus has the right to selfdetermination, the relevant inquiry becomes whether the right
to self-determination creates a right to secession and
As mentioned above, the right to selfindependence.24
determination can take forms that are less intrusive on state
Self-determination can be
sovereignty than secession.25
effectuated in different ways: self-government, autonomy, free
association,
or,
in
extreme
cases,
independence.
Understandably, the international community views secession
with suspicion,26 and traditionally, the right to independence or
19. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379.
20. Id.
21. Id. Note however that the term “people” has been purposely left undefined
under international law and that the tests seeking to determine when a group
qualifies as a people have been flexibly applied. See supra note 14.
22. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379.
23. Id.
24. “Secession” under international law refers to separation of a portion of an
existing state, whereby the separating entity either seeks to become a new state or
to join yet another state, and whereby the original state remains in existence
without the seceded territory. Successful secessions around the globe have been
rare because secession seems inherently at odds with the principles of state
sovereignty and territorial integrity, which have been core values of international
law for centuries. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 112.
25. Scharf, supra note 4, at 379.
26. Id. at 380 (noting that secession is “synonymous with the dismemberment
of states”). Note the 1970 statement by then U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant:
As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a State is
concerned, the United Nations attitude is unequivocal. As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept
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secession as a mode of self-determination has only applied to
people under colonial domination or some kind of oppression.27
However, modern-day international law has come to embrace
the right of non-colonial people to secede from an existing state,
“when the group is collectively denied civil and political rights
and subject to egregious abuses.”28 This right has become
known as the “remedial” right to secession and has its origin in
the 1920 Aaland Islands case.29
The Aaland Islands were a small island nation situated
between Finland and Sweden, belonging to the former and
seeking to reunite with the latter.30 The Aalanders claimed that
they were ethnically Swedish, and that they wished to break off
from Finland and to become a part of Sweden.31 In an advisory
opinion, the second Commission of Rapporteurs operating
within the auspices of the League of Nations held, first, that
this issue was properly of international, not domestic
jurisdiction, and second, that the Aalanders had a right to a
cultural autonomy, which had to be exercised within Finland.32
Only if Finland disrespected their ethnic and cultural autonomy
would the Aalanders’ right to separate from Finland be

and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of
its Member States.
Secretary-General’s Press Conferences, U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1970, at 34, 36.
27. Scharf, supra note 4, at 380. Note that under this view, the independence
of a colony was not considered secession, because that term referred only to the
separation from a state of a portion of its domestic territory. Id. Moreover, the
international community has also leaned on the theory of “salt-water colonialism,”
under which self-determination only applies to lands separated from the
metropolitan mother state by oceans or seas. Id.
28. Id. at 381.
29. Id.
30. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 118–19.
31. Id. at 119.
32. The League of Nations created an International Committee of Jurists to
determine whether the League of Nations had jurisdiction over this issue and the
Committee’s report generally held that the League of Nations had such jurisdiction.
Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the
League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal
Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Official Journal, Special
Supp. No. 3, at 5–10 (1920). Then, the League of Nations appointed a Commission
of Rapporteurs to recommend a solution to the Aaland Islands problem, and the
Rapporteurs report held that “separation of a minority from the State of which it
forms a part and its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an
altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will or
the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.” Aaland Islands Report,
supra note 4, at 28.
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triggered.33
Similarly, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations preconditions
the right of non-colonial people to separate from an existing
state on the denial of the right to a democratic self-government
by the mother state.34 A similar clause, striking a balance
between the right to self-determination and territorial integrity,
was inserted in the 1993 Vienna Declaration of the World
Conference on Human Rights, accepted by all United Nation
(U.N.) member states.35 Other U.N. bodies have also referred to
the right to remedial secession, such as the 1993 Report of the
Rapporteur to the U.N. Sub-Commission Against the
Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on Possible
Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive
Solution of Problems Involving Minorities,36 and the General
Recommendation XXI adopted in 1996 by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination.37
B. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLES
Most recently, the Canadian Supreme Court dealt with the
right to self-determination regarding the proposed separation of

33. Aaland Islands Report, supra note 4, at 34 (“[I]n the event that Finland . . .
refused to grant the Aaland population the guarantees which we have just
detailed . . . [t]he interests of the Aalanders . . . would then force us to advise the
separation of the islands from Finland . . . .”).
34. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity of political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or color.”).
35. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993), reprinted
in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993). Note that the Vienna Declaration, unlike the 1970
Declaration on Friendly Relations, “did not confine the list of impermissible
distinctions to those based on ‘race, creed or color,’ indicating that distinctions based
on religion, ethnicity, language or other factors would also trigger the right to
secede.” Scharf, supra note 4, at 382.
36. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Protection of Minorities: Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating
the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities, ¶ 84, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (Aug. 11, 1993).
37. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 18 at 125–26, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Sep. 30, 1996).
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During the 1990s, a secessionist
Quebec from Canada.38
movement in the Canadian province of Quebec threatened the
stability of Canada when the citizens of Quebec increasingly
sought to separate from Canada and form their own
independent state.39 A popular referendum was organized in
Quebec in 1995, in which more than 49% of the Quebecois
expressed their desire to secede from Canada, and only a very
small majority voted to stay within the mother state.40 Because
of the divided nature of the secession referendum results, the
Canadian Supreme Court was asked to issue a decision on the
question of whether Quebec had the right to secede from
Canada and if so, under what circumstances. The Canadian
Supreme Court issued its decision in 1998.41 Embracing the
Aaland Islands precedent, the Canadian Supreme Court
distinguished the right to internal self-determination from the
right to external self-determination.42 While the former refers
to a level of provincial autonomy within the existing state
(Canada in this instance), including political, civic, cultural,
religious, and social rights, the latter refers to the right to
separate from the existing state in order to form a new,
independent state.43 The Canadian Supreme Court, like the
League of Nations, held that a people has a right to internal
self-determination first, and that only if that right is not
respected by the mother state, the right to break off may
accrue.44 In other words, the right to separate is conditioned on
the non-respect of the right to some form of provincial
38. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
39. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 134.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
43. Id. ¶ 126 (defining internal self-determination as “a people’s pursuit of its
political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state,” and defining external self-determination as potentially taking the
form of secession and as arising “in only the most extreme of cases . . . under
carefully defined circumstances.”); see also Gruda, supra note 14, at 380–81
(detailing the content of the right to external self-determination and of the right to
internal self-determination).
44. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 134 (Can.) (“[W]hen a
people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession . . . .”). Note that
the Canadian Supreme Court declined to answer the issue of under what
circumstances such a right to secession accrues, as it determined that the population
of Quebec is entitled to meaningful internal self-determination and thus not in a
position to claim the right to external self-determination. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note
10, at 222.

DO NOT DELETE

146

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

autonomy.45
Recent developments in international law may also lend
credence to the idea that the right to remedial secession has
crystallized as a norm. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
Macedonia were entitled to secede because they had been denied
the proper exercise of their right to democratic self-government
and, in some cases, had been subject to ethnic violence by the
central government in Belgrade.46
These authorities suggest that if a government is at the
high end of the scale of representative government, the only
modes of self-determination that will be given international
backing are those with minimal destabilizing effect and
achieved by consent of all parties. If a government is extremely
unrepresentative and abusive, then much more potentially
destabilizing modes of self-government, including independence,
may be recognized as legitimate. In the latter case, the
secessionist group would be fully entitled to seek and receive
external aid, and third-party states and organizations would
have no duty to refrain from providing support.47
In addition to the above conclusion, I argue that all such
groups have also been supported by some of the most powerful
states in the world. As the discussion below on statehood and
recognition will demonstrate, it is the support of the Great
Powers that seems to enable minority groups to secede from
their mother state. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Macedonia were all supported by powerful European Union
(EU) countries and the United States; their plight to external
self-determination resulting in remedial secession was
logistically, financially, economically, and politically supported
by these countries. Thus, although the right to remedial
secession for oppressed peoples may be evolving into a norm of
customary law academically speaking, in practice this right
45. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 134–38 (Can.) (noting
that when “the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination
internally is somehow being totally frustrated,” only then does the right to external
self-determination accrue).
46. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 222. These former Yugoslav republics
were successful in their quest to secede from their mother state because of the help
and support of the Great Powers; thus, the Great Powers determined that these
states were entitled to secede from the former Yugoslavia. See infra Part V for
further discussion of the influence that the Great Powers have on self-determination
movements across the globe.
47. Scharf, supra note 4, at 384.
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accrues only if there is sufficient political support for the people
seeking secession.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION AND OTHER THEORIES
If the breakaway entity is supported by the most powerful
states, and if it exercises the right to external self-determination
and declares its independence, it faces the legal challenge of
proving that it qualifies as a state under international law.
Moreover, it faces the political challenge of obtaining official
recognition from the most relevant legal actors. In fact, an
entity that has not met these burdens risks being shunned by
the relevant international actors. Consequently, such an entity
cannot engage in any meaningful form of international relations
and will remain isolated, thereby undermining its chances of
achieving viability. Thus, self-determination rights are closely
connected to other legal theories, such as statehood and
recognition. In order to exercise its right to external selfdetermination, the breakaway entity may need external support
from powerful states in the form of intervention against the
territorial sovereignty of its mother state, which may seek to
prevent the breakaway entity from separating. The notion of
self-determination is, therefore, closely connected to two other
concepts: sovereignty and intervention.
A. SELF-DETERMINATION, STATEHOOD, AND RECOGNITION
Once an entity breaks off from its mother state and seeks to
become recognized as a new state, the legal question that arises
is whether that entity satisfies the relevant international legal
criteria of statehood.
According to the 1933 Montevideo
Convention, an entity can achieve statehood if it fulfills four
criteria: it has a defined territory, a permanent population, a
government, and the capacity to enter into international
relations.48 Scholars have also elaborated additional criteria for
statehood, including independence, sovereignty, permanence,
willingness and ability to observe international law, a certain
degree of civilization, and, in some cases, recognition.49
48. Seventh International Conference of American States, Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 3802 L.N.T.S. 19, art. 1
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
49. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
passim (1979).
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Statehood is a legal theory that seeks to justify the attribution
of statehood on objective criteria, which are at least, in theory,
independent from the political reality underlying many
attempts at secession or separation.50
In practice, the theory of statehood has led to anomalous
results.51 For example, the first criterion of the Montevideo
Convention requires that an entity has a defined territory.
Many entities that we routinely consider states have a disputed
and often undefined territory.52 For example, Israel’s territory
is disputed by its Arab neighbors; the two Koreas have battled
over their border for decades; potent rebel movements dispute
the territories of Somalia and Sudan.53 As to the second
criterion, many entities that we view as states have unpermanent, migratory populations. The Democratic Republic of
Congo, Sudan, and Iraq, to name a few, have all experienced
significant refugee crises, resulting in shifts in their respective
populations, without thereby losing their statehood on the
international scene.54 Other states have very small populations,
like the Pacific island state of Nauru (10,000), or the city-state
of San Marino (24,000), and yet such entities are still treated as
states.55 Regarding the third criterion, entities with collapsed
governments have also remained “states” in the past. For
example, Afghanistan throughout the 1990s did not have a
stable government, and yet it was still treated as a state and
retained its seat in all major international organizations.56
Finally, as to the fourth criterion, many entities routinely
considered states do not have the capacity to enter into
international relations.57 Small nations like Liechtenstein and
Monaco depend on Switzerland and France respectively for their

50. In fact, article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states that “[t]he political
existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states.” Montevideo
Convention, supra note 48, art. 3.
51. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115 (noting the flexible interpretation of
the statehood criteria by “global elites”).
52. Id. at 115–16.
53. Id. at 116.
54. Refugees International, DR Congo, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
where-we-work/africa/dr-congo (last visited on Oct. 14, 2009); Lydia Polgreen,
Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at
A1;
Refugees
International,
Iraq,
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/
where-we-work/middle-east/iraq (last visited on Oct. 14, 2009).
55. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115.
56. Id. at 116.
57. Id.
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national defense.58 Several Pacific island nations, likewise,
depend on the United States and New Zealand for their defense
and have been dubbed “freely associated states.”59 Other small
nations depend on the United States, and/or other economically
powerful nations, for trade and commercial relations.60
The above examples demonstrate that the legal theory of
statehood remains inconsistently applied in practice, and often
it is the geopolitical reality of a given region that dictates
whether an entity is treated as a state by the international
community.
Statehood in practice seems to hinge on
recognition: in other words, an entity seems to be treated as a
state only if the outside world, and specifically, the most
powerful states (the Great Powers), wishes to recognize it as
such.61 As I argue below in Part V, an entity will be recognized
as a new state only if it garners the support of the most
powerful states in the international legal arena.
There are two theories of recognition under international
law: the declaratory view and the constitutive view.62 Under the
former, recognition is seen as a purely political act having no
bearing on the legal elements of statehood.63 Outside states can
choose to recognize the new state, or not, but that decision does

58. Id.
59. Id. (describing the special arrangements that Micronesia, Palau, the Cook
Islands, and Niue—the co-called freely associated states—have with the United
States and with New Zealand).
60. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 115–16 (describing the various
dependent relationships that smaller and developing states sometimes have with
larger, developed states).
61. A cynic might ask why international law cares about statehood at all. In
other words, why would a newly independent state care for proving to anyone on the
outside that it meets the requirements of statehood? If the people who live in a
given country are happy with the achievement of independence, they should not
have to worry about proving to the outside world that their home nation qualifies as
a state under international law. However, the reality proves the opposite: a new
“state” faces crucial challenges after its assertion of independence, such as
economical and trade issues, developmental problems, security concerns, monetary
hurdles, etc. Thus, an entity seeking to become a state on the international scene
must first persuade external actors that it is a state in order to become fully engaged
in international relations with such external actors, on which it often depends. The
external actors on which virtually all new states depend are the most powerful
states in the world, or, as described in this Article, the Great Powers. Thus, it is the
Great Powers’ determination that an entity shall (or shall not) be recognized as a
new state that often pre-determines the outcome of a separation struggle. See infra
Part V.
62. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 137–38.
63. Id. at 137.
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not influence the legal determination of statehood.64 Under the
latter, recognition is seen as one of the main elements of
statehood.65 Thus, an entity cannot achieve statehood unless it
is recognized by outside actors as a state.66
While most academics would support the declaratory view,67
the constitutive view has teeth in practice nonetheless. In fact,
one of the four criteria of statehood—the capacity to enter into
international relations—seems closely linked to recognition,
because an entity claiming to be a state cannot conduct
international relations with other states unless those states are
willing to enter into such relations.68 In other words, the
conduct of international relations is a two-way street, involving
the new “state” as well as outside actors that have to be willing
to accept the new “state” as their sovereign partner.69 No state
can exist in a vacuum—a fact well established by international
practice. When Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) decided to
separate from Great Britain and to form an independent state in
1965, most of the world refused to recognize Southern Rhodesia
Consequently, Southern Rhodesia remained
as a state.70
isolated from the world and was unable to conduct international
The non-recognition of Southern Rhodesia by
relations.71
outside actors prevented it from fully exercising the attributes of
legal statehood.72 Thus, recognition, whether it is considered as
a political or legal act, has a direct impact on the pragmatic
determination of statehood: whether an entity will be able to

64. Id. (“An entity that meets the criteria of statehood immediately enjoys all
the rights and duties of a state regardless of the views of other states.”).
65. Id. at 138.
66. Id. (“[T]he refusal by states to afford recognition would mean that the
entity claiming statehood would not be entitled to the rights of a state.”).
67. Id.
68. Id. (arguing that “if states refuse to acknowledge that an entity meets these
criteria . . . they might continue to treat the claimant as something less than a
state;” thus, an unrecognized state may find that its passports are unacceptable to
the immigration authorities of other states).
69. Thus, an important treatise states that “[r]ecognition, while declaratory of
an existing fact, is constitutive in nature, at least so far as concerns relations with
the recognizing state.” 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts ed., 9th ed. 1992).
70. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 138. Note that the U.N. Security Council
condemned the Southern Rhodesia declaration of independence and declared that it
had no legal validity. S.C. Res. 217, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
71. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 138 (noting that nearly all states refused
to conclude treaties with Southern Rhodesia).
72. Note that the situation was resolved in 1978, following a peace accord
which led to a majority government in Zimbabwe. Id.
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truly act as a state on the international scene.
While international recognition is no longer widely considered to be a
required element of statehood, in practice the ability to exercise the
benefits bestowed on sovereign states contained in the Westphalian
sovereignty package requires respect of those doctrines and
application of them to the state in question by other states in the
interstate system.73

In addition to the declaratory and constitutive views,
scholars have advanced a third, intermediary view on
recognition. The intermediary view seeks to combine the
declaratory and constitutive view while acknowledging what
truly goes on in practice. It asserts that recognition is a political
act independent of statehood, but that outside states have a
duty to recognize a new state if that state objectively satisfies
the four criteria of statehood.74 “Recognition, while in principle
declaratory, may thus be of great importance in particular
cases. In any event, at least where the recognizing government
is addressing itself to legal rather than purely political
considerations, it is important evidence of legal status.”75
Finally, another wrinkle to the international theory of
recognition was added in the early 1990s, following the break-up
of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. At that
time, the EU foreign ministers developed guidelines on the
recognition of new states in Europe.76 Concerned with the
existence and maltreatment of minorities within the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, the EU foreign
ministers announced that the criteria for recognition of new
states within the EU would include respect for human rights, as
well as the protection of minority rights.77 Thus, an entity
applying for statehood within the EU had to prove that it
treated minority groups fairly and that it respected minority
rights in its territory.78
73. Kelly, supra note 1, at 382 (citing LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 15–16 (1995)).
74. Id. (citing LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 13–
15 (1995)).
75. CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 74.
76. European Community, Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,” 31 I.L.M. 1486, 1487 (1992)
(requiring “respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations . . . especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights,”
and “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities” in order
for a new state to be recognized).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 1486.
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While these criteria have not reached the status of
international custom and do not bind states that are not
members of the EU, they show nonetheless an evolution of
international law in the field of recognition.79 In fact, it seems
that the international community today allows outside actors to
impose additional requirements on entities striving for
recognition.80 Regional bodies, organizations, and states can
precondition recognition on compliance with specific criteria
that have nothing to do with the legal contours of statehood.
This phenomenon illustrates once more the fact that powerful
states or groups of states, like the EU, often dictate the fate of
independence-seeking movements by choosing to legitimize their
plights (or not) only under specific conditions.
In the context of the EU, such imposition of additional
criteria of recognition was used several times by the Badinter
Commission, an arbitral body of experts established to deal with
the various issues arising out of the Yugoslav crisis in the
1990s.81 With respect to Macedonia, the Badinter Commission
insisted that Macedonia undertake not to alter its frontiers by
means of force and credited Macedonia for having amended its
constitution to renounce all territorial claims against
neighboring states.82 After Macedonia agreed to follow the
Badinter Commission recommendations, the EU foreign
ministers decided to impose yet an additional requirement on
Macedonia by indicating that this new state would be
recognized only if it used a name that did not include the term
Macedonia.83 This “requirement” resulted from a geopolitical
79. The Badinter Commission, an arbitral body of experts operating in the
early 1990s to resolve legal issues arising from the Yugoslav dissolution, added a
new criterion for recognition of new states, because “it embraced democratization
and respect for human rights” as such criteria. Enver Hasani, Self-Determination
Under the Terms of the 2002 Union Agreement Between Serbia and Montenegro:
Tracing the Origins of Kosovo’s Self-Determination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 313
(2005).
80. For example, the EU set out the respect of human rights as a “fundamental
prerequisite for recognition.” Brown, supra note 14, at 247 (citing European
Community, Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,” 31 I.L.M 1486, 1486–87 (1992)).
81. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 114–15.
82. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, On the Recognition of
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and Its Member
States, July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1507 (1992). Note that the debate over Macedonian
recognition was sparked by Greek claims that Macedonia would have territorial
claims against northern Greece, a region also known as Macedonia. See DUNOFF ET
AL., supra note 10, at 142.
83. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 10, at 143. Ultimately, this issue was resolved

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION

153

grievance by EU member Greece, which was afraid that the new
State of Macedonia would have territorial claims to a part of
northern Greece that had also been known as Macedonia.84 The
use of such additional criteria for recognition by the EU signals
a trend of conditioning recognition on the respect of
fundamental rights and rules of international law, as well as on
obedience to regional geopolitical equilibrium.85 In other words,
powerful decision-makers are telling new states that they will
only be accepted as full players if they vow to respect the rule of
law and to adhere to preserving regional stability and peace.
Moreover, the use of the additional criteria for recognition
described above demonstrates the leverage and power that the
Great Powers have on the international scene. Entities seeking
to become recognized as new states must garner the support and
help of the most powerful states. As a corollary, entities seeking
to become recognized as new states must, at times, accept the
rules set forth by the super-states, as Macedonia did when it
sought to separate from the former Yugoslavia. The acceptance
of these new recognition rules by the weaker states
demonstrates their acquiescence in the new global order of
sovereign, more sovereign, and less sovereign states. Whether
an entity ultimately acquires the right to self-determine its fate
and whether it is ultimately recognized as a new state correlates
directly to whether that entity enjoys the support of the most
powerful sovereign states.
B. SELF-DETERMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERVENTION
The principle of self-determination is also closely linked to
the notions of state sovereignty and intervention.86 State
when Macedonia was admitted to the U.N. under the name of “The Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the name issue with Greece. Id. The
United Sates government decided in 2004 to refer to the country as the Republic of
Macedonia. Id.
84. Id.
85. The latter proposition of conditioning recognition on the respect of the
regional geopolitical equilibrium is well illustrated by the Greek opposition to the
recognition of Macedonia if the new entity wanted to be called by that name. In fact,
nothing in the international legal doctrine on recognition authorizes states to
require new entities to change their name if they wish to be recognized; yet, in
practice, such results are possible and have occurred at least once in Europe, as the
Macedonian example demonstrates.
86. In fact, the earned sovereignty theory also supports this view of qualified
state sovereignty, as it perceives sovereignty as “a bundle of authority and functions
which may at times be shared by the state and sub-state entities as well as
international institutions.” See James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned
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sovereignty, in its Westphalian form, typically includes: an
equality of states within the international community, a general
prohibition on foreign interference with internal affairs, a
territorial integrity of the nation-state, and an inviolability of
international borders.87 However, as early as the mid-19th
century, scholars noticed a “sliding scale of sovereign equality”
among states by linking “the degree of sovereignty a state has to
the degree of equality it enjoys on the international stage.”88
The notion of unequal state sovereignty was further enhanced
through the creation of the United Nations and its Security
Council structure, giving veto power to five super-states: the
United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China.
Scholars and historians have dubbed such powerful states the
“Great Powers.” Membership in this evolving club of supersovereign states varies, because the status of any country as a
Great Power depends on the other states’ willingness to admit
the existence of yet another super power. Nonetheless, most
would agree that the Great Powers club currently also includes
three other G-8 countries: Germany, Italy, and Japan.89 The
Great Powers possess greater sovereignty attributes than other
states because they have enhanced decision-making authority in
the institutional context, as well as in the economic realm.90
Because the Great Powers are essentially more “sovereign”
than other states, they may engage in interventions and cross
other states’ borders, in the name of preserving some higher
ideals.
In the modern world, Great Powers can “cross
theoretically unbreachable frontiers either individually or
collectively,” in a variety of differently justified state
interventions.91 One of such forms of intervention, when Great
Powers breach frontiers to avoid human suffering and tragedy,
A selfhas been termed “humanitarian intervention.”92
determination seeking people may be aided by the Great
Powers’ decision to organize a humanitarian intervention to
prevent a central government from oppressing that people.
Conversely, the Great Powers may decide not to help a
struggling minority movement, by refusing to stage an
Sovereignty: The Political Dimension, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 355, 357 (2003).
87. Kelly, supra note 1, at 376.
88. Id. at 377 (citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33
(3d ed. 1866)).
89. Id. at 365.
90. Id. at 365–66.
91. Id. at 381.
92. Id.
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intervention and by implicitly turning a blind eye to the
oppressive policies of the governing regime.
Some American presidents have embraced this intervention
theory, and have even attempted to stretch its contours by
constructing a so-called “involuntary sovereignty waiver”
justification for the application of intervention. Thus, Richard
Haass, the former Director of Policy Planning for the State
Department in the G. W. Bush administration and the current
President of the Council on Foreign Relations, advanced the
idea that countries constructively waive their traditional
sovereignty shield and invite international intervention when
they undertake to massacre their own people, harbor terrorists,
or pursue weapons of mass destruction.93 According to Haass,
state sovereignty does not enjoy absolute protection in the
modern world and has been eroded through the forces of
globalization; thus, we need to adjust our way of thinking to
account for “weak states” and “outlaw regimes” which jeopardize
their sovereignty “by pursuing reckless policies fraught with
danger for their citizens and the international community.”94
Haass further reasoned that “sovereignty is not a blank check,”
and considered that Great Powers have unique intervention
rights with respect to rogue regimes that have forfeited their
sovereign privileges and their immunity from external, armed
According to Haass, there are three
intervention.95
circumstances that justify intervention: 1) where a state
commits or fails to prevent genocide or crimes against humanity
in its territory; 2) where countries find it necessary to take
action to protect their nationals against other states that harbor
international terrorists; and 3) where states pursue weapons of
mass destruction.96
93. Haass constructed this theory initially in 2002, with respect to States
which commit atrocities against their people or harbor terrorists. Nicholas Lemann,
The Next World Order, NEW YORKER, Apr. 1, 2002, at 45–46. Haass then amended
this theory in 2003, when he included States that pursue weapons of mass
destruction. See Richard N. Haass, Remarks to the School of Foreign Service and
the Mortara Center for International Studies, Georgetown University: Sovereignty:
Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities (Jan. 14, 2003), in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, 698–99 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008),
available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/news-archive/2003/01-15.htm [hereinafter
Georgetown Speech].
94. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 403 (citing RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION:
THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev’d ed.
1999)).
95. Georgetown Speech, supra note 93, at 698; see Kelly, supra note 1, at 403.
96. Kelly, supra note 1, at 404.
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These three exceptions to the norm against intervention are
justified, according to Haass, because sovereignty is conditional,
and “[w]hen states violate minimum standards by committing,
permitting, or threatening intolerable acts against their own
people or other nations, then some of the privileges of
sovereignty are forfeited.”97 Under this theory, it can no longer
be asserted that a state may internally do whatever it wishes, as
such actions necessarily impact other states,98 and thus give
rights to other states to intervene. In other words, when a state
engages in a particular kind of offensive behavior, it has
involuntarily “waived” its sovereignty.99 The involuntary waiver
of sovereignty theory illustrates another example of the
dominance exercised by the Great Powers on the international
scene. Under this theory, the Great Powers have expanded
rights to intervene in the affairs of another, less sovereign,
country anytime that the Great Powers see the other country’s
behavior as troublesome. Thus, the Great Powers, and not the
United Nations or any other global body, acquire global
decision-making authority under the involuntary sovereignty
waiver theory when it comes to intervention within any other
country, anywhere in the world, at any time. The Great Powers
rule, and hegemony, over the rest of the world becomes
dangerously potent if one adopts the involuntary sovereignty
waiver theory without any reservations or restrictions.
The theory of involuntary sovereignty waiver has been
advanced in the recent decades to justify different types of
intervention against different “rogue” regimes. For example, in
1991, a U.N.-sanctioned intervention on behalf of the Kurds in
northern Iraq was justified on the grounds that the Kurds were
suffering severe human rights deprivations inflicted by the Iraqi
More recently, the North Atlantic Treaty
government.100
Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999
exemplifies the notion of humanitarian intervention justified on
the grounds of involuntary sovereignty waiver. Serbia engaged
in a campaign of human rights violations in Kosovo; by doing so,
under this theory it waived its sovereignty over the Kosovar
region and “invited” outside actors to intervene.101 Thus,
97. Id. at 405 (citing RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN
MILITARY FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev’d ed. 1999)).
98. Kelly, supra note 1, at 404–05.
99. Id. at 402 (citing Lemann, supra note 93, at 42).
100. Scharf, supra note 4, at 383.
101. See infra Part V (discussing the idea of an involuntary sovereignty waiver

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

RIGHT TO EXTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION

157

outside actors were legally justified in encouraging and
providing for the Kosovar independence because Serbia’s claim
to territorial sovereignty was not absolute and remained subject
to external influences.102 In other words, because of the Serbian
government’s oppressive policies in Kosovo, Serbian sovereignty
over Kosovo diminished to such a minimal level that the notion
of territorial sovereignty became trumped by the necessity of
humanitarian intervention or other kinds of outside
interference.103
The idea of self-determination, in the modern world, seems
closely linked to state sovereignty and intervention. Because
states are only “conditionally” sovereign, they may not suppress
legitimate self-determination movements indefinitely. If states
choose to oppress self-determination movements, then such
movements may seek help from external actors, typically the
Great Powers, which may intervene to help the struggling
movement achieve some form of self-determination. As in the
case of Kosovo, the Great Powers may intervene to assist the
struggling movement in achieving the most drastic form of
external self-determination, namely, remedial secession and
independence.104 The presence of the Great Powers on the
international legal scene has eroded the sovereignty of other,
“lesser” states. Thus, the sovereignty of the lesser states has
become conditional. Moreover, the Great Powers have indicated
their willingness to intervene in the affairs of such lesser states
by rogue states and regimes, whereby such rogue states and regimes involuntary
waive their sovereignty and invite external interference to remedy their own
wrongdoing).
102. Several influential authors have supported external intervention in Kosovo
on humanitarian grounds. See generally Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are
We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian
Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23 (1999); Richard A.
Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
847 (1999); Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857 (1999);
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 824 (1999); Ruth Wedgewood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
828 (1999). Other authors have supported NATO actions against the FRY with
reservations, arguing that the Kosovo case should not set a precedent for the future
but should be considered an exception due to regional considerations after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. See W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 860, 860 (1999).
103. See Reisman, supra note 102, at 860–62 (arguing that human rights
violations in Kosovo effectively eliminated the defense of domestic jurisdiction and
merited military action).
104. In the case of Kosovo, the Great Powers intervened through NATO by
engaging in a series of air strikes on the territory of Kosovo’s then mother-state, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See infra Part IV.C.
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to aid independence-seeking movements, when such movements
are viewed as legitimate by the Great Powers.105 The notion of
self-determination has therefore become intertwined with the
notions of state sovereignty and intervention, and all three are
intrinsically linked with the presence of the Great Powers.
IV. CASE STUDIES
Several case studies illustrate the link between selfdetermination, state sovereignty, and intervention described
above. These studies include East Timor, Chechnya, Kosovo,
and Georgia. In each of these countries a “people” struggled for
self-determination and ultimately independence. Yet, only the
Timorese and the Kosovars were successful in their plight for
self-determination, primarily because the Great Powers
determined that their cause was legitimate. The Chechens, and
the South Ossetians and Abkhazians, were not as lucky: their
struggles for self-determination remained unsupported by the
Great Powers and these regions still remain governed by the
same central regimes.
A. EAST TIMOR
East Timor forcibly became a part of Indonesia in 1976,
when Indonesia claimed East Timor as its 27th Province.106
Prior to 1976, East Timor had been colonized and administered
by Portugal.107 The international community was swift in its
condemnation of Indonesia following the 1976 takeover and the
United Nations continued to recognize Portugal as East Timor’s
official administrator.108 The Indonesian rule over East Timor
“imposed a military force that viciously led to human rights and
humanity violations,”109 and was often marked by extreme
violence and brutality. Estimates of the number of East
Timorese who died during the occupation vary from 60,000 to

105. As will be discussed below, the examples of East Timor and Kosovo
illustrate the idea of minority movements aided by the world community in their
quest for independence. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
106. Jani Purnawanty, Various Perspectives in Understanding the East Timor
Crisis, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 61, 65 (2000).
107. Id. at 62 (noting that the Portuguese first colonized East Timor in 1533).
108. Jonathan I. Charney, Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo and East
Timor, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455, 465 & n.36 (2001).
109. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 68–69.
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200,000.110
In 1999, the East Timorese people voted in a United
Nations-organized referendum to separate from Indonesia.111
Indonesia protested the referendum results and was accused of
backing violent militias to attack and intimidate the East
Timorese populations.112 The United Nations Security Council,
in Resolution 1264, established the International Force for East
Timor, a peacekeeping force to safeguard the country.113 East
Timor was then administered by the United Nations, with
substantial support from other countries. East Timor became
the first new sovereign state of the 21st century by obtaining
independence on May 20, 2002 when United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan handed over authority of the country to the
new government.114 A few months later, East Timor joined the
United Nations as a new, independent state.115 Sporadic
outbreaks of violence have plagued East Timor since its
independence, but the constant military involvement by the
international community has managed to halt the spread of
violence.116
The East Timorese struggle for independence illustrates
perfectly the paradigm of how the Great Powers’ support, or lack
thereof, influences the result of such a self-determination
struggle. The East Timorese people fought for independence
during several decades. During the Cold War era, however,
their struggle was unsupported by some of the Great Powers,
and the East Timorese were not able to assert independence
from Indonesia on their own, as they lacked the political,
economic, and military capability to do so. After the end of the

110. See Joe Nunes, East Timor: Acceptable Slaughters, http://chss.montclair.edu/
english/furr/nunestimor.html (last modified Sept. 8, 1999).
111. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 67.
112. See, e.g., id. (“In fact, the Indonesian Military has been accused of arming,
funding and preparing local militias for a guerrilla movement in case a proindependence group should emerge as a winner of the conflict.”); see also Jean
d’Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administration as Democracy-Building Instruments,
9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2008) (noting that violence ensued after the United Nations
organized referendum).
113. Purnawanty, supra note 106, at 70.
114. East Timor: Birth of a Nation, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, May 19, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1996673.stm [hereinafter East Timor, Birth];
see also Timor-Leste: UN Admits Newest Member State, UN NEWS CENTRE Sept. 27,
2002, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=27 (declaring East
Timor the first new country of the millennium).
115. UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 114.
116. East Timor, Birth, supra note 114.
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Cold War, the Great Powers began supporting the East
Timorese, which was reflected in the Security Council decisionmaking process, when virtually all Security Council members
agreed that the East Timorese should no longer remain
governed by Indonesia.117 Thus, the United Nations Security
Council authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to East
Timor and helped organize the popular referendum and
elections, which ultimately paved the way to Timorese
independence.118 Absent the global and the Great Powers’
support in the post Cold War period, it is doubtful that East
Timor would have gained independence from Indonesia as
easily.
B. CHECHNYA
Chechnya existed until the early 1990s as part of the former
Soviet Union.119 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Chechnya obtained de facto independence after the socalled First Chechen War with Russia.120 During this period,
Chechnya became a “center of criminal activities of
extraordinary proportions” and generally failed to build any
representative institutions of a viable state.121 In fact, after the
First Chechen War, parliamentary and presidential elections
took place in January 1997, and the newly elected government
in Chechnya, while seeking to maintain Chechen sovereignty,
appealed to Moscow for help.122 Chechnya needed to rebuild
itself, as its infrastructure and economy were heavily

117. See Sreeram Chaulia, A World of Selfistans?, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,
Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/171-emerging/
29875.html (“As long as General Suharto [the Indonesian leader] was necessary for
the West’s Cold War agenda, the United States, Britain, and Australia helped
Indonesia to annex and control East Timor. Once Indonesia lost the support of the
great powers, these same states ganged up to recognize East Timor’s right to selfdetermination and acted as midwives for its birth as an independent state.”).
118. Scholars have already noted the support of the United Nations for the East
Timorese struggle for independence. See, e.g., d’Aspremont, supra note 112, at 8–10.
119. See Freedom House, Chechnya [Russia] (2003), http://www.freedomhouse.org/
modules/mod_call_dsp_country-fiw.cfm?year=2003&country=2593 (last visited on
Oct. 14, 2009).
120. Charney, supra note 108, at 462–63 & n.27.
121. Id. at 463; see also James Marson, The Price of Chechnya’s Peace,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/17/
chechnya-russia-withdrawal-moscow (noting that Chechnya had de facto
independence after the First Chechen War).
122. See Freedom House, supra note 119.
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Russia sent money for the
undermined by the war.123
rehabilitation of the Chechen State, but most of these funds
were stolen by Chechen authorities and distributed between
favored warlords.124 Chechnya also faced a refugee crisis;
almost half a million people had been internally displaced and
lived in refugee camps or overcrowded villages.125 Fearing
further violence, Russian military troops remained stationed in
Chechnya.126
In September 1999, Moscow accused the Chechens with
involvement in a series of apartment bombings, which took
place in several Russian cities.127 As a retaliatory measure,
Russia initiated a prolonged air campaign of military strikes
against Chechnya, followed by a ground offensive in October
1999.128 The latter effectively started the Second Chechen
Because the second war had been much better
War.129
organized and planned than the first Chechen War, Russian
military forces were quickly able to re-establish control over
most Chechen regions.130 In February 2000, Russian forces
recaptured Grozny, the Chechen capital, and the proindependence Chechen regime crumbled.131 In the following
years, Russia was successful in installing a pro-Russia Chechen
regime, and the most prominent separatist leaders died.132
Nonetheless, violence still occurs in the North Caucasus and
Chechnya remains a troubled and potentially explosive
region.133
Chechnya illustrates the idea of a struggling minority
group, seeking self-determination rights from the central
government (Russia), unaided by the Great Powers.134 Alone,
123. See id. (noting that Chechnya pressured Moscow for help after the war
because its “economy and infrastructure were virtually destroyed”).
124. See id. (noting that reconstruction efforts have been plagued by corruption).
125. ALEX GOLDFARB WITH MARINA LITVINENKO, DEATH OF A DISSIDENT: THE
POISONING OF ALEXANDER LITVINENKO AND THE RETURN OF THE KGB 95 (2007).
126. See Freedom House, supra note 119 (noting that the 1996 peace deal called
for the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Chechnya).
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Scholars have already noted the lack of international support for Chechnya,
attributing it to the fact that Russia was a major military and economic power,
holding veto power on the U.N. Security Council. See Charney, supra note 108, at
459.
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Chechnya could not face the Russian military power and could
not undertake the economic challenges of achieving viability as
an independent state. Some have suggested that it is the
Chechen inability to build democratic institutions and peace
during its de facto independence, in between the two Chechen
Wars, which caused the Great Powers to refuse to recognize
Chechnya as a legitimate self-determination seeking entity.135
However, I posit that it is the Russian membership in the Great
Powers, and precisely, the Russian veto power on the Security
Council, which directly caused the lack of international
involvement in Chechnya.136 Unlike the situation in East Timor
and in Kosovo, as will be discussed directly below, the Great
Powers had no incentive to help Chechnya achieve
independence and statehood. One of the Great Powers, Russia,
was directly opposed to any Chechen form of sovereignty
because Russia managed to reacquire control over Chechnya
and has always viewed it as a territory of Russia.137 I argue
that the other Great Powers, including the United States, have
simply not had enough geopolitical clout and stamina to engage
in a full-blown diplomatic, and possibly military, altercation
with Russia over the Chechen situation. Thus, while the other
Great Powers were sympathetic to the Chechen cause and
outraged by human rights violations in Chechnya, their rhetoric
remained relatively mild and none of them chose to formally
oppose Russia.
Chechnya could not and cannot achieve
independence alone.
C. KOSOVO
Kosovo had been an autonomous province of Serbia, one of
the six republics within the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY).138 When the SFRY dissolved in the early
1990s, Kosovo remained a part of the SFRY successor, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) first, then a part of Serbia
and Montenegro, and when Montenegro broke away from the

135. Id. at 462–63.
136. Even scholars like Charney, who advances the idea that the Chechens’
inability to build democratic institutions contributed to the lack of international
support for their cause, freely admit that it is at least possible that Russia’s
tremendous power as a state may have prevented the Chechens from garnering
significant international support. Id. at 459.
137. See Freedom House, supra note 119.
138. Brown, supra note 14, at 238.
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latter, Kosovo remained a part of the sole Serbian State.139
Until the late 1980s, Kosovo had the status of an
autonomous province within the SFRY and exercised important
regional self-governance functions.140 More importantly, its
predominantly ethnic Albanian population enjoyed multiple
rights, such as the right to education in the Albanian language,
the right to Albanian language media, the right to celebrate
cultural holidays, and the right to generally preserve its ethnic
structure and belonging.141 However, in response to ethnic
Albanian uprising movements throughout Kosovo, staged by
guerilla-like paramilitary groups, the Serbian leadership
undertook draconian measures in the late 1980s to curb the
upheaval.142 Thus, Kosovo’s autonomous province status was
removed and the Albanian population was deprived of
important civil and political rights.143
In 1999, when the former Serbian president Slobodan
Milosevic engaged in a brutal campaign of oppression144—once
again in response to ethnic upheavals in Kosovo staged by the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a separatist movement
operating in Kosovo145—the international community responded
139. Id. at 238–40.
140. The 1974 SFRY Constitution granted Kosovo the status of an autonomous
province within the country’s federal structure. Gruda, supra note 13, at 387.
Under the terms of the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo had the following rights: the right
to adopt and change its constitution; the right to adopt laws; the right to exercise
constitutional judicial functions and to have a constitutional court; judicial
autonomy and the right to a Supreme Court; the right to decide on changes of its
territory; the right to ratify treaties that were concluded with foreign states and
international bodies; the right to have independent organs and ministries within the
local government. Id.
141. Henry H. Perritt Jr., Final Status for Kosovo, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 7
(2005) (noting that Kosovar Albanians were allowed to open an Albanian-language
university in Pristina in 1969, and that the institutional changes under the 1974
SFRY Constitution resulted “in the growing Albanization of educational, political,
and legal institutions”); see also Gruda, supra note 13, at 387 (noting the significant
political and legal autonomy granted to Kosovo by the 1974 SFRY Constitution).
142. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (describing the measures undertaken by
Slobodan Milosevic beginning in 1989 to curb the Albanian upheaval).
143. Brown, supra note 14, at 263 (noting that amendments to Serbia’s
constitution in 1989 and 1990 negated the Kosovar autonomy).
144. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (describing the Serbian campaign of ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo, accompanied by massive violence against the Kosovar
Albanians by Serbian paramilitary, military and police forces).
145. Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict
Over Kosovo’s Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 387, 397 (2003) (“[S]ome
elements of the Kosovar Albanian population formed the Kosovo Liberation Army
[KLA], which murdered members of the Serbian police and military forces and
perceived Kosovar Albanian collaborators.”); see also Perritt, supra note 141, at 8
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with force.146 NATO countries launched a series of air strikes
on the territory of Serbia, which ultimately forced Milosevic to
sign a peace agreement with the Kosovars at Rambouillet,
France, in June 1999.147 Under the terms of the Rambouillet
Peace Agreement and, subsequently, United Nations Resolution
1244, Kosovo was to be administered by a United Nations
provisional authority, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK). Its safety was to be guarded by a NATO-led military
force, KFOR, and subsequent negotiations were to take place in
the near future, to decide about the true fate of the province.148
Once Milosevic stepped down as Serbia’s president and
leader, the Serbian outlook and its position toward the West
changed and Milosevic’s nationalist rule was replaced by a more
“Western-focused government.”149 It became clear that in order
to join Western Europe—and possibly become a member of the
EU—Serbia had to sacrifice Kosovo, or to at least refrain from
using force in order to prevent it from breaking off.150 The
(noting that the KLA began attacking Serbian police and military facilities in
Kosovo).
146. Perritt, supra note 141, at 8 (indicating that NATO began its bombing
campaign “aimed at ending ethnic cleansing and protecting human rights in
Kosovo”); see also IAIN KING & WHIT MASON, PEACE AT ANY PRICE: HOW THE WORLD
FAILED KOSOVO 43–45 (2006) (describing the events leading up to the NATO air
strikes in the former Yugoslavia).
147. Hasani, supra note 79, at 320 (noting that the refusal of Serbia to agree to
the Rambouillet Accords caused the NATO bombing campaign); see also Brown,
supra note 14, at 240 (noting how the NATO bombing campaign was successful in
forcing the Yugoslav government to agree to terms of peace).
148. See Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb. 23,
1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/www/
regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html
[hereinafter
Rambouillet
Accords].
Moreover, Security Council Resolution 1244 directly references the Rambouillet
Accords for the purpose of determining Kosovo’s future status. S.C. Res. 1244,
¶ 11(e), U.N. SCOR 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999)
[hereinafter Resolution 1244].
Thus, Resolution 1244 represents the legal
foundation upon which “the civilian and military branches of the international
administration in Kosovo are based.” Hasani, supra note 79, at 323; see Resolution
1244; see also Gruda, supra note 14, at 356 (noting that Resolution 1244 provides for
the civil administration of Kosovo). Under Resolution 1244, Kosovo was occupied by
a multilateral force (KFOR) and administered by a United Nations Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK). See Hasani, supra note 79, at 323–25 (providing a detailed
discussion of the U.N. administrative regime over Kosovo under the terms of the
Rambouillet Agreement).
149. Williams, supra note 145, at 415 (describing the political changes in Serbia
as a result of Milosevic’s removal from office).
150. For example, during a recent trip to Serbia, in March 2008, I witnessed a
peaceful political protest on the streets of Novi Sad, the capital of the northern
province of Vojvodina, where protesters were carrying banners with signs reading:
“We have a right to the European future” and “Don’t let Kosovo slow us down.” This
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relevant players, including the Serbian leadership, the Kosovar
representatives, and U.N. and EU representatives, negotiated
several times, but because of strong differences about the future
of Kosovo, they were never able to reach consensus.151 In fact,
Serbia, while pragmatically recognizing the need to
accommodate western demands,152 maintained its position that
Kosovo remain a territorial part of Serbia with strong regional
autonomy.153 Kosovo, on the other hand, insisted that it
deserved independence.154
On February 17, 2008, backed by powerful world countries
like the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, the
Kosovar Parliament voted on a declaration of independence.155
In the few days following the Kosovar declaration of
independence, the United States, as well as about twenty EU
countries, formally recognized Kosovo as a new state.156 Thus,
Kosovo illustrates a situation similar to that of East Timor: a
struggling minority group, seeking self-determination is aided
by the Great Powers and is ultimately able to achieve
independence from its central government, in this case, Serbia.
Without the help of the Great Powers, and precisely, the
demonstrates that a portion of the Serbian population seems aware of the necessity
to let go of Kosovo in order to have access into Europe.
151. Viola Trebicka, Lessons from the Kosovo Status Talks: On Humanitarian
Intervention and Self-Determination, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 255, 256–58 (2007)
(describing the so-called status talks on the future of Kosovo and the fact that a
“brokered political agreement . . . has proven much more elusive than was first
thought”).
152. Timothy Garton Ash, This Dependent Independence is the Least Worst
Solution for Kosovo, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2008/feb/21/kosovo (comparing the loss of Kosovo for Serbia as a loss of a
“gangrenous arm” and concluding that this is a “precondition of recovery”).
153. In fact, the day after the Kosovar declaration of independence, the Serbian
President, Boris Tadic, “appealed to the UN Security Council to declare Kosovo’s
‘unilateral and illegal’ declaration of independence ‘null and void,’” because Kosovo’s
separation “violates Security Council Resolution 1244 which reaffirms Serbia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Ban Ki-moon Urges Restraint by All Sides
After Kosovo Declares Independence, UNMIK NEWS COVERAGE, Feb. 18, 2008,
http://www.unmikonline.org/archives/news02_08full.htm.
154. Trebicka, supra note 151, at 255 (observing that the Kosovar Albanians
have demanded their right to self-determination, which would lead to secession).
155. See UNMIK NEWS COVERAGE, supra note 153.
156. For example, as of February 18, 2008, the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Belgium had all expressed support for the “new state of
Kosovo.” Id. Note, however, that several states expressed their opposition to the
Kosovar independence, including Spain, Russia, China, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.
Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, Kosovo is Recognized but Rebuked by Others, N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
19,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe/
19kosovo.html.
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military intervention staged by the Great Powers through
NATO, the Kosovars would not have been able to secede from
Serbia.157 Moreover, without the political support of the Great
Powers and the Great Powers’ willingness to recognize Kosovo
as a new state, the Kosovars would not have been able to assert
their independence from Serbia as easily as they did in
February 2009.
D. GEORGIA
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are breakaway provinces
within the former Soviet republic of Georgia.158 These two
provinces have functioned as de facto states in recent years, and
spurred international controversy during the summer of 2008,
when Russia decided to support the two provinces by sending
military troops to Georgia.159 The Russian intervention evolved
into war between Georgia on one side and Russia, South Ossetia
and Abkhazia on the other.
In August 2008, when the Georgian armed forces pushed
into South Ossetia, Russia accused Georgia of genocide,
claiming that thousands of South Ossetian civilians were killed
by the Georgian troops.160 In response, Russia sent troops into
South Ossetia and launched air strikes on Georgian territory.161
After a few days of heavy fighting, Georgian troops were ejected
from South Ossetia.162 Meanwhile, the Russian military troops
157. In fact, in October 2008, the U.N. General Assembly agreed to the request
of Serbia to have the ICJ legally examine the validity of the Kosovar secession.
Kosovo Blunder Goes to Court, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2008, at K8. Thus, it will be
interesting to read the World Court’s legal pronouncement on the case of Kosovo—
whether the World Court offers a legal justification for the separation will be
indicative of whether the separation was legally versus politically justified.
158. See Nikolai Pavlov, Russia, Georgia Seek Control of South Ossetia Capital,
(Aug.
8,
2008),
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/
REUTERS
idUSL768040420080808?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0.
See also 1
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDEP. INT’L FACT-FINDING MISSION ON THE
CONFLICT IN GEOR., at 7, 17 (2009), available at http://www.ceiig.ch.
159. See id.; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 13.
160. Tom Parfitt, Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll, Says Human
Rights Group, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/
13/georgia; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 10, 21.
161. See Mikhail Barabanov, The August War Between Russia and Georgia,
MOSCOW DEFENSE BRIEF, #3, 2008, available at http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/
3-2008/item3/article1/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2009); see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 10.
162. See Barabanov, supra 161; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 158, at 10–11 (detailing the invasion of South Ossetia by Georgian
troops, and Russia’s role in stopping the advance of Georgian forces).
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stationed in Abkhazia began marching into Georgia; this
advance into Georgia was accompanied by reports of widespread
looting, burning, and killing of civilians by Ossetian militia.163
On August 12, the Russian president ordered a halt to Russian
military operations in Georgia, and a peace plan was brokered
by the EU which Russia, Georgia, as well as the South Ossetian
and Abkhazian separatist leaders signed and endorsed.164
Yet, Russia has refused to withdraw its military troops from
Georgia. Russia has also signaled no intention to end its
military presence in the disputed Georgian regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.165 In fact, on August 25, 2008, Russia
recognized these as independent states.166 Russia now says that
its troops stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are guests of
the newly-born nations, and their status is not regulated by the
above-mentioned peace plan.167
Currently, the status of South Ossetia is being negotiated
between the central government of Georgia and the Russiansupported separatist government of South Ossetia.168 Recently,
163. Luke Harding & James Meikle, Georgian Villages Burned and Looted as
Russian Tanks Advance, GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2008/aug/13/georgia.russia6; see also 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 158, at 27 (adding gender-related crime including rape, assault, hostagetaking, and arbitrary arrests to the list of offenses committed by the Southern
Ossetians).
164. See Andrew E. Kramer, A French-Brokered Peace Offers Russia a Rationale
to Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A1 (explaining the points of the peace
deal); Russian President Orders Halt to Military Operations in Georgia, RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO
LIBERTY,
Aug.
12,
2008,
http://www.rferl.org/content/
Russian_Planes_Renew_Attacks_On_Gori/1190334.html. But cf. 1 COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 158, at 22 (stating that while a ceasefire was
brokered, the Russian and South Ossetian forces reportedly continued their
advances for some days after and occupied additional territories, including the
Akhalgori district).
165. See Kramer, supra note 164.
166. See Gregory L. White & John W. Miller, Russia Raises Ante on Separatist
Georgia Regions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2008, at A9; 1 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 158, at 37 (explaining that this assertion by Russia greatly
hinders the possibility of resolution). Nicaragua and Venezuela are the only two
other countries to recognize the states. Venezuela's Foreign Policy: Dreams of a
Different World, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2009; Gregory Dubinsky, The Exceptions That
Disprove the Rule? The Impact of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on Exceptions to the
Sovereignty Principle, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 241 (2009).
167. See generally Kramer, supra note 164 (stating that Russia is defining the
continued presence as a peacekeeping measure); 2 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 158, at 188–89 (expressing the Russian viewpoint that its troops
in those regions have always been peacekeepers and its action during the conflict
were simply in self-defense of the peacekeepers).
168. See White & Miller, supra note 166, at A11.
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these negotiations have broken down in light of Russia’s
decision to reinforce the region militarily and give Russian
passports to South Ossetians.169 The government of Georgia has
expressed that it views these moves as attempts by Russia to
effectively annex the region.170 The Georgian government levels
the same criticism against Russian involvement in Abkhazia,
which currently remains a province of Georgia, but which
operates as a de facto state.171 Most recently, the Georgian
government has accused Russia of attempting to stage a brief
military mutiny in Georgia in an effort to thwart NATO military
exercises in Georgia.172
Most of the western Great Powers have expressed their
support of Georgia and have refused to recognize the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.173 Even Russia,
although it officially supports such independence, is rumored to
in fact want to annex these two regions.174 South Ossetia and
Abkhazia therefore illustrate examples of unsuccessful selfdetermination struggles, where a minority group or a people is
unsupported by the Great Powers and is thus unable to achieve
independence. In fact, the South Ossetian leader has recently
expressed his frustration at this lack of support by the Great
Powers, by complaining that his country has not been able to
become independent, although it has a better legal case for
independence than Kosovo, which did become independent.175
V. APPLICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION RIGHTS IN
THE MODERN WORLD
From the above discussion and case studies, it is clear that
the right to self-determination for different minority groups or
169. See Damien McElroy, South Ossetian Police Tell Georgians to Take a
Russian Passport, or Leave Their Homes, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 30, 2008, at 17.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., West Condemns Russia Over Georgia, BBC NEWS, Aug. 26, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7583164.stm.
172. See Olesya Vartanyan & Ellen Barry, On Eve of NATO Exercise, Georgia
Says It Foiled Mutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at A10.
173. Most NATO countries would prefer that Georgia remain intact, as they
have been exploring the possibility of Georgia joining NATO. See Steven Erlanger,
NATO Duel Centers on Georgia and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2008, at A8.
174. See id.
175. Bush Warns Moscow Over Breakaway Autonomy, CNN.COM, Aug. 25, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/25/russia.vote/index.html (“We have
more political-legal grounds than Kosovo to have our independence
recognized . . . .”).
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peoples varies from region to region.176 While the Timorese and
the Kosovars were able to fully exercise their rights to the most
extreme form of self-determination, leading toward remedial
secession, the Chechens, the South Ossetians, and the
Abkhazians have been denied such rights.177 Arguably, the
latter three peoples have been denied any form of selfdetermination, and many have asserted that these peoples’
rights are routinely oppressed by their mother states.178 What
does this suggest about the modern-day contours of the right to
self-determination? What are the modern-day criteria a people
must fulfill in order to be able to legitimately gain some degree
of self-determination?
I argue that a people must satisfy the following four
criteria: it has to show that it has been oppressed; that its
central government is relatively weak; that it has already been
administered in some form by some international organization;
and that it has the support of the Great Powers.
First, the people seeking to exercise its right to selfdetermination must prove that they have been subject to
oppression and have faced harsh human rights abuses and
violations. Typically, a people attract global attention only
when it can demonstrate how horrifically it is being treated and
how abusive its central government is. Instances of mild human
rights violations generally do not attract the same level of
international political and media scrutiny, and central
governments that commit minor minority group abuses typically
go unnoticed.179 Thus, peoples that have managed to showcase
their struggles have always been able to demonstrate a high

176. See supra Part IV.
177. See supra Part IV.
178. On the oppression of Chechnya by its mother-state, Russia, see supra Part
IV.B. On the independence struggles of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, see supra Part
IV.D.
179. The suffering of many minority groups has remained isolated, garnering no
or little support from the international community. The Rwandan genocide was not
prevented by the world community. Kelly, supra note 1, at 381 (mentioning the
“unchecked genocide in Rwanda”). The Kurds have been left on their own. Id. at
396 (describing the world inaction when the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein used
chemical weapons against Kurdish people in Iraq in 1988). In addition to these
groups’ struggles, there are many other self-determination seeking groups around
the globe that have been fighting for their cause in relative obscurity. Examples of
such groups include the Kashmiris fighting for independence from India, the Basque
and the Catalan (from Spain), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (from Sri
Lanka), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (from the Philippines). See Chaulia,
supra note 117.
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level of suffering and a consistent policy of harsh abuse by the
central government. Second, the same people must show that
its central government—the “rogue” regime committing
abuses—is relatively weak and cannot properly administer the
people’s province or region. In fact, none of the peoples across
the globe that have succeeded in asserting their rights to selfdetermination have been governed by strong, powerful
governments.180 Typically, self-determination seeking groups
have been able to demonstrate that their central government,
although claiming that it wants to govern such groups, is really
militarily, politically, or structurally unable to assert proper
control. Many breakaway regions have been marred by civil
unrest and violence that have further contributed to the idea
that these peoples or groups, in order to have any kind of civic
stability, must be allowed to separate.181 Third, the selfdetermination seeking people must show that some form of
international administration of its region has been needed in
the recent years, and that international authorities have had to
govern because of the brutality and inefficacy of the central
government.182 This criterion is linked to the second one:
peoples seeking self-determination have successfully shown that
their central governments were weak, causing violence and
unrest, and that international authorities have needed to step in
to preserve or reestablish peace.
Thus, international
organizations and groups have been involved in virtually all
Finally, the selfself-determination seeking regions.183
determination-seeking people must prove that external actors,
including the Great Powers, view its struggle as legitimate and
are ready to embrace it as a new sovereign partner. I allege
that this ultimate criterion is the most important one, and that
it routinely determines the fate of various peoples struggling for
the recognition of their rights across the globe.

180. The Indonesian rule over East Timor had been weakened by the time the
Timorese asserted their independence rights, and the same was true of the Serbian
reign over Kosovo. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
181. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
182. Audio tape: Panel on International Law, Politics and the Future of Kosovo,
held by the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 9–12,
2008), available at http://www.asil.org/events/am08post/selectaudio.html (explaining
that international administration was a component of Kosovo’s achievement of
independence).
183. East Timor had been guarded by a U.N. force, see East Timor, Birth, supra
note 114; Kosovo had been administered by a U.N. force called UNMIK, see Sterio,
supra note 10, at 272.
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Whether the Great Powers decide to legitimize a people’s
struggle for self-determination is crucial for the outcome of such
a struggle. First, the Great Powers control hugely important
media outlets and the global access to information.184 If the
Great Powers decide not to give media coverage to a struggling
people or region, that people will remain unnoticed on the global
scene, and its suffering will attract no significant external
involvement. Alternatively, its suffering will be downplayed by
the Great Powers and will be discarded as not warranting true
intervention. Second, the Great Powers have, throughout the
years, provided key military and logistic support to states across
the globe. Some central governments have been able to retain
control over portions of their territories simply because of
support by the Great Powers.185 Conversely, some central
governments have lacked such support and have not been able
to control breakaway regions and popular movements within
their territories.186 Thus, it is the Great Powers that contribute
toward the stability, or lack thereof, of central governments
across our planet. Third, the Great Powers control the United
Nations system through their veto powers on the Security
Council.187 It is only when the Great Powers agree that the
184. See, e.g., Stephen J. Rapp, Achieving Accountability for the Greatest
Crimes—the Legacy of the International Tribunals, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 272 (2007)
(discussing the powerful role of the media in inciting the Rwandan genocide); Robert
A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse,
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 101 (1998) (discussing the power over national
media that the U.S. President has in the United States); Joshua D. Reader, Note,
The Case Against China Establishing International Liability for China’s Response to
the 2002–2003 SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 519, 557 n.253 (2006)
(discussing the deliberate policy of media control that the Chinese government
undertakes). These examples illustrate the important role that the media plays
domestically and internationally, and the importance of control asserted by powerful
governments over their national media.
185. For example, throughout the Cold War, Indonesia was able to retain control
over East Timor with the help of some of the Great Powers, namely, the United
States, Great Britain, and Australia. Chaulia, supra note 117. Similarly, Turkey
has been able to “ward off claims of a separate Kurdistan, thanks to Ankara’s sixdecades-long closeness to Washington.” Id. Finally, Israel has been able to ignore
Palestinian claims for independence for decades, also with “American blessings.” Id.
186. For example, Indonesia has not been able to retain its grip over the East
Timor province, nor has Serbia been able to do so over Kosovo. See supra Parts
IV.A, IV.C. In both cases, the central governments (Indonesia and Serbia) were
unaided by the Great Powers and in both cases, the minority groups (the East
Timorese and the Kosovars) were supported by the Great Powers in their selfdetermination quests. See Chaulia, supra note 117.
187. See Kelly, supra note 1, at 394. While it is true that some Great Powers,
like Germany, Italy, and Japan, do not have veto power on the Security Council,
these countries nonetheless have powerful and important allies on the Security

DO NOT DELETE

172

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

Security Council can authorize the deployment of military
troops, peacekeepers, or international administrators to a
troubled region.188 Thus, peoples whose struggles are not
viewed as legitimate by the Great Powers will never be able to
garner Security Council support for the creation of some form of
an international administration within their region.189 Finally,
if peoples are seeking to separate from a Great Power, as in the
case of Chechnya struggling to gain independence from Russia,
their quest for self-determination will most likely fail. Great
Powers themselves have potent militaries to quash dissent
within or close to their borders, like in the case of Russia
intervening in Chechnya and in Georgia, and no other countries
want to run the risk of offending a Great Power by supporting a
minority, independence seeking group within the Great Power’s
territory. The Great Powers seem to be immune from pressures
of self-determination, and their borders are unlikely to yield to
secessionist movements.
Even the very notion of humanitarian intervention remains
inextricably linked with approval by the Great Powers.190
Humanitarian intervention is always organized, structured,
financed, and led by some of the Great Powers; other countries
simply do not have enough power, leverage, or resources on the
international scene to engage in such intervention. Even
proponents of the above-described involuntary waiver of
sovereignty theory acknowledge that it is up to the Great
Powers to determine when a country has so waived its
sovereignty. Haass, when questioned about the issue of who
decides when a state is committing atrocious actions that would
trigger intervention, seemed to imply that the United States,
and possibly the other Great Powers, should decide.191
Council and can exercise significant influence in its deliberations.
188. See id.
189. Basically, peoples that struggle for independence from strong, powerful
countries, will not succeed because “[l]arge and powerful countries with stable
polities such as Russia, China, and India can defend their territorial integrity and
are unlikely to become candidates for Kosovo-type challenges.” Chaulia, supra note
117. Moreover, peoples that struggle for independence from countries that are
backed by the Great Powers are also unlikely to succeed. “States like Israel and
Turkey are proving that, as long as they enjoy American blessings, they can see
through secessionism and even undertake cross-border raids on militants
threatening their sovereignty.” Id.
190. See supra Part III.B.
191. Richard N. Haass, Pondering Primacy, 4 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 91, 92–93
(2003) (“[T]here is no single source of authority or legitimacy. . . . [T]he United
Nations is not yet at the point where it alone can decide what is legitimate and what
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According to Haass, the Great Powers should act multilaterally
to stop genocide, terrorists, and WMD, even outside of the U.N.
collective security apparatus, and the Great Powers should have
flexibility (read: decision-making authority) to engage in
intervention across the globe.192 Thus, it is the Great Powers’
support, or lack thereof, toward a people’s struggle for selfdetermination that determines the outcome of such a struggle.
As the above-described case studies demonstrate, all peoples
that have successfully exercised some form of self-determination
have been supported by the Great Powers.193 The converse is
equally true: all peoples that are still living as part of an
oppressive, central regime have been unable to garner the
support of the Great Powers.194
Another important issue that merits discussion is what
motivation drives the Great Powers in their decision to support,
or not, a struggling self-determination movement or people. In
other words, why were the Great Powers supportive of East
Timor and Kosovo, and not of Chechnya and the Georgian
provinces? As I have demonstrated above,195 the Great Powers
seem intent on helping groups, movements and states when it is
in their geopolitical interest to do so. The Great Powers may
deem that they have a strong regional partner in State X; if that
is the case, they may help State X government economically,
politically, and militarily. Consequently, State X will have a
strong central government and any opposition and minority
movements will be severely quashed, with the help of the Great
Powers. During the Cold War, this is what took place in
Indonesia and East Timor: the former was viewed as an
important political ally to the West against the Soviet bloc, and
thus received aid as well as financial and military support, and
East Timor was ignored in its struggle for independence.196
Similarly, Kosovo may be viewed as an important potential

is not. Well then, who decides? Is it the United States or some other government?
The answer is that you have to look at the case at hand and you have to try to make
a case in the court of international public opinion. . . . [Y]ou have to base your
actions on norms.”).
192. Kelly, supra note 1, at 409.
193. See supra Part IV.
194. Examples of such peoples include the Chechens, the South Ossetians and
the Abkhazians, as well as Tibetans. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.D; see also Chaulia,
supra note 117 (describing that Tibet has been ruled and oppressed by China over
the last 40 years).
195. See supra Part IV.
196. See supra Part IV.A; see also Chaulia, supra note 117.

DO NOT DELETE

174

11/19/2009 9:06 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

partner to the West in its opposition to any dangerous Serbian
expansion; thus, Kosovar independence was favored by the
Great Powers over Serbian territorial integrity.197
The Great Powers may also prefer not to offend other Great
Powers and may choose not to support a struggling group. In
the case of Chechnya, the Great Powers chose not to engage in a
political, diplomatic or military scuffle with Russia and they
turned a blind eye to the Chechen pleas for independence.198
The case of the Georgian provinces illustrates the geopolitical
motivations of the Great Powers as well. The western Great
Powers view Georgia as an important ally against Russia and
have thus opposed independence movements that threaten
Georgian territorial integrity.
These Great Powers have
opposed South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence. Russia,
on the contrary, has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia
because it dislikes Georgia and would like to strengthen its own
political and military situation in the Caucuses by embracing
regional allies like the two breakaway provinces.199 The Great
Powers conduct affairs on the international scene by focusing on
their own strategic interests first, and by choosing to support a
group or not in light of those same interests. The right to
external self-determination can be easily placed in this dynamic.
The Great Powers embrace the principle, but choose to support
it in real situations only when their own interests are served by
such exercise of external self-determination by a specific people.
The right to external self-determination has become
entrenched in the notion of the rule by the Great Powers, which
has in turn modified traditional ideas about statehood,
recognition, sovereignty, and intervention. As described above,
an entity seeking to exercise its external self-determination
rights must prove to the outside actors, and today, the Great
Powers, that it qualifies as a state. As described above, because
the Great Powers are essentially more sovereign than all other
states, they may engage in interventions across the globe, and
such interventions may aid an independence-seeking people, or
may directly impede its struggle for independence. Thus, the
Great Powers’ rule has directly affected concepts like statehood,
recognition, sovereignty, and intervention, and has shaped
external self-determination struggles in a particularly political
manner. In other words, it is only when a people is supported
197.
198.
199.

See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.D.
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politically by the Great Powers that it will manage to acquire
independence and statehood through the exercise of external
self-determination.
The legal criteria for external selfdetermination have become somewhat mooted by the necessity
to obtain the political support of the Great Powers for any
struggling people on our planet.200
One may wonder about the soundness of this rule by the
Great Powers. After all, it can be argued that if several key
states agree on something or disagree on something, their
consensus should play a crucial role in the decided issue.201 For
example, if the most important states on our planet agree that
Kosovo ought to become independent, perhaps their
independence is a good solution. However, I believe that the
rule by the Great Powers inherently undermines state equality
and the entire sovereignty-based system of global international
relations.202 While a decision by the Great Powers may be
politically appropriate and important for the Great Powers, it
should not have any bearing on the legality of any potential
separation. Thus, I believe that it is unfortunate that the right
200. A perfect example of this assertion would be the different treatment by the
world community of the Kosovars versus the Chechens in these respective groups’
plights for self-determination. See Charney, supra note 108, at 458–59 (“While in
Kosovo the international community essentially endorsed the Albanian Kosovar’s
claims to self-determination, in Chechnya the reactions were more muted,
essentially focusing on opposition to the violence used by the Russians against the
Chechens without reference to their possible right to self-determination, within or
without Russia. This distinction may be easily dismissed by experts in international
relations due to the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is a relatively
poor country that was run by a person already indicted by the ICTY for
international crimes—Slobodan Milosevic—and his supporters. On the other hand,
Russia despite its troubles was a significant military power with substantial
economic resources. . . . Furthermore, it is a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, holding the veto right.”).
201. This is what Haass advocates: a concert of Great Powers, working together
outside of the confines of the U.N. system, as the world’s policemen. Kelly, supra
note 1, at 409.
202. For example, scholars have already noted the uneven application of the
involuntary sovereignty waiver theory, asserting that this theory only applies:
[T]o states that can physically withstand the intervention (China and
Russia—which are abusing minority ethnic groups within their borders, or
North Korea —pursuing WMD) or those states that are on otherwise
friendly terms with the proposed interveners (Pakistan—pursuing WMD,
or, although not rising to the level of genocide, Mexico—abusing indigenous
nationals in Chiapas, and Turkey—repressing its Kurdish population).
Consequently, the policy only operates against countries such as Serbia,
Afghanistan, and Iraq that cannot resist American power.
Kelly, supra note 1, at 413.
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to self-determination in the modern-day world entails not only
legal, but also political criteria. This topic, however, shall
remain the subject of a future article.
VI. CONCLUSION
A people under modern-day international law accrues the
right to some form of self-determination if it can demonstrate
that it has been subjected to harsh oppression, that it has a
relatively weak central government, that some type of
international administration of its region has already taken
place, and that it has garnered the support of the most
sovereign states on our planet, the so-called Great Powers. It is
my conclusion that the last criterion tends to be the most
important one and that it directly influences the outcome of
most self-determination struggles in the modern world. In fact,
recent history demonstrates that self-determination seeking
groups are able to exercise their independence option only if
they enjoy the Great Powers’ support. All of the other criteria
for self-determination, as I have argued throughout this Article,
seem to have been absorbed into the question of whether the
struggling people has succeeded in persuading the Great Powers
that its cause is worthy of independence. It is the Great Powers
that control the outcome of most self-determination struggles in
today’s world, through their military, political, financial, and
economic dominance, exercised in international organizations
and directly through concepts such as humanitarian
intervention and involuntary sovereignty waiver. We have thus
witnessed a return of the Great Powers’ rule. “Selfistans” will
be successful in their struggle to become states if the Great
Powers determine that they are worthy of being treated as
sovereigns on the world stage.
Thus, in today’s world, the right to self-determination
seems to entail a mixture of legal and political criteria, with the
latter often prevailing over the former. While I believe that this
situation, termed the rule by the Great Powers, is inherently at
odds with the idea of state sovereignty and equality, this
observation remains to be explored in a future academic
endeavor.

